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ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK:  
PROSPECT THEORY AND DUAL-PROCESS THEORY 
Dalong Ma 
July 23, 2014 
 
This research addresses the question of why some people become entrepreneurs 
whereas others do not. The debate has been going on for decades in entrepreneurship. In 
this dissertation, I address this question by decomposing it into two related questions. The 
first question is whether entrepreneurs make different decisions compared to non-
entrepreneurs when they are facing the same opportunities under risk. The second question 
is whether these differences in decision-making (if any) are due to the natural proclivity of 
entrepreneurs themselves. To identify the differences of entrepreneurial decision-making 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, this study investigates the nexus between 
entrepreneurs and opportunities from both aspects simultaneously. From an entrepreneur’s 
aspect, based on dual-process theory, I examine how different styles of entrepreneurial 
thinking influence their decision-making.  Considering an opportunity itself, based on 
prospect theory, I test how different types of opportunity framing influence entrepreneurial 
decision-making.  
vi 
The results indicate that entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than non-
entrepreneurs do when they are facing the same opportunities under risk. The opportunities 
in a loss frame have higher evaluations than those in a gain frame. The evaluations are 
higher in System 2 thinking than in System 1 thinking. The findings suggest that 
entrepreneurs do make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs and that these 
differences are more likely due to the natural proclivities of at least some entrepreneurs. 
These findings provide new insights for the entrepreneurial decision-making literature and 
enlighten some promising future research. 
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In this chapter, I develop my research questions based on the entrepreneurship 
literature. First, I describe my research motivation based on the discussion of a well-known 
paper in entrepreneurship. The unresolved questions left by this paper are my motivation 
for this dissertation. Broadly, I investigate why some people become entrepreneurs whereas 
others do not. Then, in order to specify my research questions, I discuss entrepreneurial 
opportunities, entrepreneurial decision-making, and the differences between entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs. Next, I review the nexus between opportunities and entrepreneurs 
that is the essence of entrepreneurial decision-making. Unlike other scholars who only have 
examined this nexus from either the perspective of opportunities or the perspective of 
entrepreneurs, I investigate it from both aspects. On the opportunity side, I am interested 
in how different types of framing influence entrepreneurial decision-making. On the 
entrepreneur side, I am interested in how different styles of thinking influence 
entrepreneurial decision-making. Finally, I specify my research questions. 
Motivation 
 Busenitz and Barney (1997) explored the differences between entrepreneurs and 
managers in large organizations. They found that entrepreneurs use biases and heuristics 
2 
more than managers in large organizations when they are making strategic decisions. They 
argued that entrepreneurs make many decisions for which there is little or no hard 
information because the entrepreneurial environment is uncertain and complex. “In this 
context, simplifying biases and heuristics may have a great deal of utility in enabling 
entrepreneurs to make decisions that exploit brief windows of opportunity” (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997, p. 14). They concluded “that the extent to which decision-makers deviate 
from a strict econometric approach may not be a constant, that different individuals may 
utilize biases and heuristics to different degrees” (Busenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 23) and that 
“biases and heuristics can be an effective and efficient guide to decision-making” (Busenitz 
& Barney, 1997, p. 9). 
Busenitz and Barney’s paper (1997) has become one of the most cited papers in 
entrepreneurship1. However, there still are three unresolved questions left. First, Busenitz 
and Barney (1997) showed that entrepreneurs can make efficient decisions by using biases 
and heuristics, however they did not address the quality of these decisions. The efficiency 
and effectiveness of results are both important for decision-making. We cannot examine 
decision-making only from the perspective of efficiency without regard for the effect of a 
decision. In other words, there are two kinds of decision-making: one uses more biases and 
heuristics; whereas, the other uses more analysis and calculation. Entrepreneurs can use 
the former approach to make efficient decisions. However, we do not know the 
effectiveness of their decision-making. If entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics in 
                                                 
1 Cited by 1474 times according to Google Scholar (scholar.google.com) on 6/15/2014. 
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decision-making, will they make bad decisions or good decisions compared to using more 
analysis and calculation? 
Second, we do not know whether this cognitive difference of using biases and 
heuristics exists between entrepreneurs and the general population because Busenitz and 
Barney (1997) only compared entrepreneurs with managers in large organizations. Both 
entrepreneurs and managers are special cases from the general population. We cannot make 
the conclusion that entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics than the general 
population only based on the observation that entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics 
than managers. There are several possible explanations of this observation. For example, 
(a) entrepreneurs use more bias and heuristics than the general population; whereas, 
managers are the same as the general population. (b) Entrepreneurs are the same as the 
general population; whereas, managers use more analysis and calculation than the general 
population. (c) Entrepreneurs use more biases and heuristics than the general population; 
whereas, managers use more analysis and calculation than the general population. 
Therefore, to examine the differences between entrepreneurs and the general population, 
we must sample from these two populations. 
Third, even if entrepreneurs were different from the general population regarding 
their greater use of biases and heuristics, there is no evidence that “those who are more 
susceptible to the use of biases and heuristics in decision-making are the very ones who 
are most likely to become entrepreneurs” (Busenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 14). In other words, 
we cannot simply conclude that this difference is due to their natural proclivity, which 
implies that particular attributes exist before people become entrepreneurs, which may 
partially explain why they become entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurs could be the 
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same as the general population when they become entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, due to 
environmental uncertainty and complexity, they may adapt to use more biases and 
heuristics. In other words, this difference in decision-making may be an acquired attribute 
from entrepreneurial practice. 
These three unresolved questions connect to my research questions. My first 
research question is: do entrepreneurs make different decisions from non-entrepreneurs 
when they face opportunities? I focus on the results of their decisions. In other words, I am 
interested in the effectiveness of their decisions, which addresses the first unresolved 
question. In the meantime, I compare entrepreneurs with non-entrepreneurs, which 
addresses the second unresolved question. Furthermore, if I identify any differences in 
decision-making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, I investigate whether these 
differences are due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs, which drives them to become 
entrepreneurs or if the differences evolve after a period of time during which they are 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, my second research question addresses the third unresolved 
question. 
Opportunity  
Opportunities are “those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, 
and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production” 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 220). According to neoclassical economic theory, 
because economic actors cannot generate economic wealth under perfect competition, an 
opportunity will appear when competitive imperfections exist in markets (Barney, 1986; 
Venkataraman, 1997). These competitive imperfections can exist as “important entry 
barriers, heterogeneously distributed information or capabilities, significant transaction 
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costs, the opportunity to produce heterogeneous products, nonprofit maximizing entities in 
the market, and so forth” (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013, p. 302). The opportunities 
generate economic wealth that is equal to the difference between the value of an economic 
actor’s assets and the cost of those assets (Alvarez et al., 2013).  
Although scholars have different perspectives about opportunities based on 
different assumptions and boundary conditions, in this dissertation, I only examine 
opportunities that exist exogenously and can be discovered by systematic search. In 
particular, I consider opportunities that exist ex ante and that have specific risks and payoffs. 
People can recognize these risks and payoffs. 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is a process that is intended to identify, evaluate, and exploit 
opportunities. Its focus has been attributed to be the nexus between entrepreneurs and 
opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012). This nexus is also the 
fundamental of entrepreneurial decision-making. Scholars have examined both aspects of 
this nexus from various perspectives, even though there is still much that we do not 
understand about. First, one of the reasons that individuals have different beliefs about 
opportunities may be due to their natural proclivities. When people face the same 
opportunity, only some of them may think it is feasible. On the other hand, when an 
individual faces a variety of opportunities, he or she may not think all of them are feasible 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Scholars have examined these individual differences from 
various perspectives, such as age and gender (Long, 1982), prior knowledge (Fiet, 2007; 
Shane, 2000), human capital (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Unger, Rauch, Frese, 
& Rosenbusch, 2011) , and alertness (McCaffrey, 2013; Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012).  
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Second, opportunity differences also influence opportunity discovery. Compared 
to individual differences, differences in opportunity have been studied much less. Scholars 
have examined opportunity differences from various perspectives, even though there is still 
much that we do not understand about them. For example, scholars have investigated the 
attractiveness of an opportunity (Holland & Shepherd, 2013), the technology required by 
an opportunity (Choi & Shepherd, 2004), and the structural alignment of an opportunity 
(Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010). Another aspect could be the framing of an opportunity, 
which refers to an individual’s interpretation of an opportunity. Scholars have found that 
the framing of options will influence individuals’ decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
In my dissertation, I investigate how different types of framing influence entrepreneurial 
decision-making under risk. 
Third, scholars have used different theories to investigate the nexus between 
entrepreneurs and opportunities, such as, constrained systematic search (Fiet, 2007), 
resource based theory (Choi & Shepherd, 2004), threshold theory (Holland & Shepherd, 
2013), and evolutionary theory (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). In addition, other theories may 
also help us to understand the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities. For example, 
prospect theory more accurately explains decision making than expected utility theory 
(Camerer, 2004). In my dissertation, I use prospect theory to investigate entrepreneurial 
decision-making under risk. 
Many previous studies have investigated decision making under risk (Edwards, 
1954). Knight (1921) was the first to use the term risk to refer to a situation in which both 
outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence are known to the decision maker; whereas 
uncertainty refers a situation in which some of outcomes and/or their probabilities of 
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occurrence are unknown to the decision maker. The difference between a risk and an 
uncertainty is that a risk is measurable; whereas, an uncertainty is unmeasurable (Knight, 
1921).  
Differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs 
To begin to understand why some people become entrepreneurs and others do not, 
the first step may be to identify the important differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs. The second step would be to confirm these differences are due to the natural 
proclivity of entrepreneurs or acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice (Alvarez et 
al., 2013). 
Scholars have examined different factors that are likely to distinguish entrepreneurs 
from non-entrepreneurs. Early research focused on personality and demographic 
differences, such as age and gender (Long, 1982) and Big-Five personality traits (Wooten, 
Timmerman, & Folger, 1999). Researchers have also examined different psychological 
factors, such as locus of control (Shapero, 1975), need for achievement (Begley & Boyd, 
1988), and affect (Baron, 2008). However, these approaches have identified very few, even 
if limited, systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz 
& Barney, 1997). For example, scholars find personality and demographic differences are 
quite small and rarely systematic (Cooper & Dunkelberg, 1987).  
Recently scholars have focused on possible cognitive differences, such as 
overconfidence and representativeness (Busenitz & Barney, 1997) and intuitiveness 
(Allinson, Chell, & Hayes, 2000). Although they have found some differences, it is not 
known whether these differences are due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs 
that drives them to become entrepreneurs or the acquired attributes that are the result of 
8 
entrepreneurial practice (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). This dissertation explores these 
possible sources of differences. 
Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
“Entrepreneurs increasingly operate at the edge of human knowledge in making 
pioneering decisions that [may] bring fundamentally new products and services into 
existence” (McVea, 2009, p. 491). These decisions are crucial for entrepreneurs and their 
firms. For example, scholars have found that the wrong decisions about expected returns 
are the major reason for the high failure rate among nascent entrepreneurial firms (Hayward, 
Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). However, the uncertainty and complexity of the 
entrepreneurial environment make entrepreneurial decision-making more difficult. As a 
result, entrepreneurs may use biases and heuristics to make decisions efficiently (Busenitz 
& Barney, 1997). 
There is a growing body of work on entrepreneurial decision-making that has found 
that entrepreneurs may make decisions based on various heuristics and biases (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997; Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009; McVea, 2009; Shepherd, 
2011). For example, scholars have examined overconfidence (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; 
Forbes, 2005; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000), intuition (Blume & Covin, 2011; 
Kickul et al., 2009; Mitchell, Friga, & Mitchell, 2005), and affect (Baron, 2008; Foo, Uy, 
& Baron, 2009). This kind of research “provides an opportunity to gain a deeper 
understanding of within-individual (i.e., intra-individual) variance” (Shepherd, 2011, p. 
417).  
This dissertation investigates entrepreneurial decision-making based on the nexus 
between opportunities and entrepreneurs. Although scholars have examined this nexus for 
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decades, most studies only focus on one side of the nexus, either opportunities or 
entrepreneurs. To investigate the nature of this nexus further, this dissertation studies both 
aspects of it. That is, I investigate both the differences between opportunities and the 
differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
Scholars have provided evidence that biases and heuristics are essential in 
entrepreneurial decision-making. Because my dissertation investigates entrepreneurial 
decision-making, I must choose the theories that have the power to explain behaviors under 
biases and heuristics.  
The first theory I chose is prospect theory. Prospect theory argues that a reference 
point, framing, a subjective value function, and a weighting function will influence 
individuals’ decision-making under risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, 
prospect theory can explain how the framing of an opportunity will influence 
entrepreneurial decision-making. 
The second theory I chose is dual-process theory. Dual-process argues that there 
are two systems interactively involved in individuals’ decision-making. Dual-process 
theory refers to them as System 1 decision-making, which is a rapid, automatic, associative, 
and intuitive process, and System 2 decision-making, which is a slower, rule-governed, 
analytic, and deliberate process (Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010). If individuals use 
more System 1 when they make decisions, they will generate intuition. If individuals use 
more system 2 when they make decisions, they will exhibit analysis. It is very rare for an 
individual to make a decision only based on one system. System 1 and System 2 are 
functioning in parallel and interacting when an individual makes decisions. Thus, an 
individual will make an intuitive decision when using more System 1 thinking. Whereas 
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regarding a same situation, the individual might make an analytic decision when using 
more System 2 thinking. Therefore, I argue that the style of thinking (use more System 1 
or System 2) will influence entrepreneurial decision-making. Figure 1 shows the theoretical 




Prospect theory has become an influential decision-making perspective, especially 
under risky conditions (Birnbaum, 2008; Bromiley, 2010; Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, 
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011). It offers a descriptive model of decision-making under risk 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It argues that people exhibit 
loss aversion, which means that they are more sensitive to losses than to gains when having 
to make decisions under risk (Köbberling & Wakker, 2005). Prospect theory argues that 
loss aversion reflects on a value function that is concave for gains but convex for losses 
and is deeper for losses than for gains (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007; 
Figure 1. The theoretical structure. 
Nexus 
Opportunities Entrepreneurs 
Gain vs. Loss 
Framing 
System 1 vs. System 
2 Thinking 




Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Schmidt, Starmer, & Sugden, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991). 
In order to demonstrate prospect theory, researchers often confront subjects with a 
pair of economic decisions. An individual chooses the higher overall value option based 
on a reference point. The reference point is a neutral position used to determine the extent 
to which outcomes constitute gains or losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is a gain 
when an outcome is above the reference point and it is a loss when an outcome is below 
the reference point.  
For a given question, individuals can make decisions in two different frames: a gain 
frame which refers to anticipating an outcome in excess of one’s reference point and a loss 
frame which refers to anticipating an outcome below one’s reference point (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). 
The value of an economic decision depends on outcomes and their associated 
probabilities. For example, suppose there is an economic decision with outcomes x and y 
with probabilities p and q.  
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑣(𝑥) ∗ 𝑤(𝑝) + 𝑣(𝑦) ∗ 𝑤(𝑞) 
Here, v(.) is the value function which depicts the subjective value of an outcome 
and w(.) is probability weighting function which depicts the decision weight for a 
probability.  
The value function is subjective as is the utility function, however framing also 
influences the subjective value. Under some frames, an individual may associate a higher 
value than the utility, and vice versa.  
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There are four properties of the value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Individuals evaluate outcomes relative to reference points; the value function is concave 
above the reference point and convex below; the value function incorporates diminishing 
sensitivity; and prospect theory assumes that individuals are risk averse, which means they 
prefer a sure gain to a set of probabilistic gains with the same expected value. Diminishing 
sensitivity means that the difference between the subjective values of two outcomes is 
larger, the closer those outcomes are to the reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Figure 2 shows the subjective value function. 
𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑎,       𝑥 ≥ 0 
𝑣(𝑥) = −𝜆|𝑥|𝑎, 𝑥 ≤ 0 
𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑒, 0 < 𝑎 < 1, 𝜆 > 0 
In the formulas above, 𝑎 determines the shape of the subjective value function, 
which is concave in the gain frame and convex in the loss frame. The 𝜆 is the loss aversion 
index, which determines the difference between the values of gains and losses. If 𝜆 > 1, 








-30 -10 10 30
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an individual will exhibit loss aversion, which means that “losses loom larger than 
corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303) as shown in Figure 2. The 
parameter 𝜆 differs across individuals. 
The probability weighting function describes an individual’s subjective weighting 
of probabilities. Prospect theory suggests that individuals usually exhibit behavior to 
overweight probabilities near 0 while underweighting large probabilities. This 
phenomenon results in an inverse “S” shape curve of weighting function. In the equation 
below, the 𝑘+ indicates the gain frame and 𝑘− indicates the loss frame. The 𝑘+ is closely 
identical with 𝑘− for an individual, however they are different across individuals (Tversky 























I discuss prospect theory in detail in Chapter II. 
Dual-Process Theory 
There is growing interest in the role of intuition in entrepreneurial decision-making 
under risk (Blume & Covin, 2011; Kickul et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2005). However most 
intuition research in entrepreneurship has a limitation that considers intuition and analysis 
as opposite ends of a continuum. For example, Allinson and Hayes (1996) developed the 
Cognitive Style Index (CSI) to measure the cognitive style of entrepreneurs, which 
indicates whether people are more intuitive or more analytical. Based on CSI, Allinson, 
Chell, and Hayes (2000) examined the cognitive styles of entrepreneurs and managers. 
They found that entrepreneurs are similar to senior managers in cognitive styles; however, 
entrepreneurs are more intuitive than the general population and more intuitive than middle 
and junior managers. Based on cognitive style, Kickul et al. (2009) found intuitive 
entrepreneurs are more confident in their ability to identify and recognize opportunities 
whereas analytical entrepreneurs are more confident in their abilities to assess, evaluate, 
plan, and marshal resources.  
However, there is a dispute about the cognitive style of individuals. Dual-process 
theory argues that there are two distinct systems in human information processing: System 
1, which is fast, holistic, and does not require conscious cognitive effort, and System 2, 
which is slower, analytic, and rule based (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas et al., 2010). If 
individuals use more System 1 when they are making decisions, they will exhibit more 
intuition. If individuals use more System 2, they are more analytical. These two systems 
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are not exclusive; individuals can use them simultaneously. For example, experts can 
generate high usage of both systems (Salas et al., 2010). When individuals make decisions, 
they often combine the results from both systems. Sometime the results are consistent. 
Sometimes the results are different or conflict, thus individuals must either choose one or 
compromise between them (Evans & Frankish, 2009). 
Scholars refer to System 1 using different names, such as implicit system, 
associative system, or intuitive system. Scholars also refer to System 2 using different 
names, such as explicit system, rule-based system, rational system, or analytic system. 
Although scholars use different terms to describe features of these two systems (see a 
summary in Table 1), individuals will exhibit more intuition if they use more System 1 
when they are making decisions, and more analysis if they use more System 2.  
Table 1 
Features Attributed by Various Theorists to the Two Systems of Cognition 
System 1  System 2 
Evolutionarily old  Evolutionarily recent 
Unconscious, preconscious  Conscious 
Shared with animals  Uniquely (distinctively) human 
Implicit knowledge  Explicit knowledge 
Automatic  Controlled 
Fast  Slow 
Parallel  Sequential 
High capacity  Low capacity 
Intuitive  Reflective 
Contextualized  Abstract 
Pragmatic  Logical 
Associative  Rule-based 
Independent of general intelligence  Linked to general intelligence 
(Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 16)  
 
Between these two types of systems thinking, System 1 thinking draws more 
attention from entrepreneurship scholars (Blume & Covin, 2011). Sinclair and Ashkanasy 
(2005, p. 357) define intuition as “a non-sequential information processing mode, which 
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comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any 
use of conscious reasoning.” Plessner and Betsch (2008) provided an alternative definition 
of intuition: 
Intuition is a process of thinking. The input to this process is mostly provided by 
knowledge stored in long-term memory that has been primarily acquired via 
associative learning. The input is processed automatically and without 
conscious awareness. The output of the process is a feeling that can serve as a 
basis for judgments and decisions. (p. 4) 
Although intuition has been defined in many ways, researchers now agree that there 
are three core components of intuition: the inputs, processes, and outcomes (Blume & 
Covin, 2011; Salas et al., 2010). My study is consistent with some recent works adopting 
Dane and Pratt’s (2007) definition of intuition (Blume & Covin, 2011; Salas et al., 2010). 
Dane and Pratt (2007, p. 33) define intuition as “affectively charged judgments that arise 
through rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations.”  
While some scholars have found that intuition is related to creativity and innovation, 
opportunity recognition, and improved organizational performance (Mitchell et al., 2005), 
others have found that analysis can improve entrepreneurial performance. For example, 
Delmar and Shane (2003) have found that business planning can help entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making concerning venture development. Patel and Fiet (2009) have found that 
systematic search can improve entrepreneurs’ decision-making concerning firm founding.  
However, intuitive thinking is only part of the process of decision-making. Analytic 
thinking is also important for decision-making. Recent studies have found that there are 
significant differences between intuitive thinking and analytic thinking. For example, 
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analytic decision making has been shown to increase unethical behaviors and reduce 
altruistic motives (Zhong, 2011), and analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief 
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). However, the difference between intuitive and analytic 
decision-making has yet to be fully addressed in entrepreneurship literature, especially 
when entrepreneurs make decisions under conditions of risk.  
Consequently, entrepreneurs use both System 1 and System 2 thinking when they 
make decisions. They will be more intuitive when they use more System 1 thinking 
whereas they will be more analytic when they use more System 2 thinking. Therefore I 
argue that the different styles of thinking (use more System 1 or System 2 thinking) may 
influence entrepreneurial decision-making. 
I discuss dual-process theory in detail in Chapter II. 
Research Questions 
Broadly, my dissertation addresses the question: why do some people become 
entrepreneurs whereas others do not? I address this question by decomposing it into two 
related questions. The first question is whether entrepreneurs make different decisions 
compared to non-entrepreneurs. The second question is whether these differences in 
decision-making (if any) are due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs themselves that 
drives them to become entrepreneurs. 
The nexus between opportunities and entrepreneurs is the essence of 
entrepreneurial decision-making. To understand this nexus, it is better to study it from both 
aspects. Prospect theory has become prominent in explaining how different types of 
framing influence decisions (Barberis, 2013; Holmes et al., 2011).  Whereas, dual-process 
theory has become preeminent in explaining how different styles of thinking influence the 
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decisions (Evans, 2008; Salas et al., 2010). Because both prospect theory and dual-process 
theory can help us understand entrepreneurial decision-making under risk and there are 
many profound studies in each stream, I combine these two theories to investigate 
entrepreneurial decision-making based on the nexus between opportunities and 
entrepreneurs. 
There is another reason that I chose prospect theory and dual-process theory. 
Scholars have used these two theories to examine the biases and heuristics in decision-
making outside of entrepreneurship for decades and discovered many insightful findings 
(Barberis, 2013; Evans, 2008). For example, Camerer (2004) has found cumulative 
prospect theory has better power than expected utility in explaining the phenomena in ten 
fields (see Appendix B). However, no known study has used them to examine 
entrepreneurial decision-making. I believe these two theories can significantly improve our 
understanding of entrepreneurial decision-making. 
In particular, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs may make different decisions 
not only based on the probabilities and payoffs of opportunities but also based on the 
different framing of opportunities as well as different styles of thinking. Therefore, I 
specify my first research question as:  
RQ1: When confronted with opportunities that are framed differently and usage of 
different styles of thinking, do entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs make different 
decisions? 
If I could successfully identify some differences in decision-making between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, I would have the further chance to examine whether 
these cognitive differences were due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs or due to 
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entrepreneurial practice. In other words, if I observe some differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, are these differences the cause or the result? If they 
were the cause, this would mean that these factors were due to the natural proclivity of 
some people, which drives them to become entrepreneurs. If they were the result, this 
would mean that these factors were acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice. 
Therefore, my second research question is:  
RQ2: Are these cognitive differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs, which drives them to become entrepreneurs, 
or acquired attributes from entrepreneurial practice? 
20 
CHAPTER II  
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I review prospect theory and dual-process theory in detail. Most 
findings from these two theories are based on the general population. However, these two 
theories also can explain entrepreneurial decision-making. Based on a literature review, I 
develop my hypotheses. 
Expected Utility Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that decision making under risk is a choice 
among prospects. They define a prospect (𝑥1, 𝑝1; 𝑥2, 𝑝2; … ; 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛) as a contract that yields 
outcome 𝑥𝑖 with probability 𝑝𝑖, where 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛 = 1. For simplification, I omit 
null outcomes. Therefore, (𝑥, 𝑝) = (𝑥, 𝑝; 0, 1 − 𝑝), which is the prospect that there is a 
probability 𝑝 to yield 𝑥 and a probability 1 − 𝑝 to yield 0. Also if the outcome is certain, 
the prospect is denoted as (𝑥). 
To explain an individual’s decision making under risk, scholars developed expected 
utility theory  (Bernoulli, 1954; Edwards, 1954; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals value a prospect based on its 
expected utility, which is the probability-weighted utility of the outcomes. 




Where each 𝑥𝑖  is a different outcome, 𝑢(𝑥𝑖)  is the utility of 𝑥𝑖 , and 𝑝𝑖  is the 
probability that 𝑥𝑖 will occur. That is, the expected utility of a prospect, U, is the sum of 
probability-weighted utilities of all outcomes. 
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals prefer more utility. Therefore, a 
prospect is acceptable if and only if the prospect will increase utility. The prospect 
(𝑥1, 𝑝1; 𝑥2, 𝑝2; … ; 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛)  is acceptable iff 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑥1, 𝑝1; 𝑤 + 𝑥2, 𝑝2; … ; 𝑤 + 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛) >
𝑢(𝑤). Here 𝑤 is the initial asset. 
Expected utility theory suggests the utility of an outcome depends on an 
individual’s initial wealth. Therefore, the same outcome may have different utility for 
individuals depending on how much initial wealth they have. For example, a person will 
value $100 much more when he or she has zero dollars than when he or she has a million 
dollars, that is, the $100 has different marginal utility based on the initial wealth. Marginal 
utility is the amount that utility increases with an increase of one unit of the outcome. 
Therefore, the marginal utility of an outcome will be influenced by the initial position, that 
is, the more initial wealth an individual has, the less the marginal utility he or she will gain 
for an outcome. For example, an individual will prefer $200 over $100. The same 
individual will still prefer $10,100 over $10,000, however, the strength of preference will 
be less. Therefore, the relation between utility and an outcome will be concave because of 
decreasing marginal utility, that is, 𝑢 is concave (𝑢′′ < 0). 
Expected utility theory suggests that individuals may exhibit risk aversion, 
preferring the certain prospect (x) to any probabilistic prospect with the same expected 
value x. For example, there are two options: A, get $100 for sure; B, 50% chance to get 
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$200, and 50% chance to get $0. Although two options have same expected values, 
individuals will prefer option A because of risk aversion. 
Prospect Theory 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) critique expected utility theory because it cannot 
explain the certainty effect, reflection effect, and isolation effect that individuals exhibit in 
decision making under risk. The certainty effect occurs when individuals underweight 
outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with 
certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, perhaps 𝑈(4,000, .8) < 𝑈(3,000). 
That is, individuals prefer a prospect, which has a certain outcome of 3,000 over a prospect 
which has .8 probability of 4,000 and .2 probability of 0. Notice that the expected value of 
the latter is 3,200. The certainty effect is generated by risk aversion, which is a preference 
for a certain outcome over a probabilistic outcome, which has the same expected value as 
a certain outcome. Individuals even prefer a certain outcome over some probabilistic 
outcomes, even though the risky outcomes may have a higher expected value. 
The reflection effect occurs when the reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the 
preference order (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, 𝑈(4,000, .8) < 𝑈(3,000) 
while 𝑈(−4,000, .8) > 𝑈(−3,000). That is, individuals prefer a prospect, which has .8 
probability of 4,000 loss and .2 probability of 0 loss more than the prospect which has 
certain loss of 3,000. Therefore, when the prospect is about a loss instead of a gain, the 
preference order is reversed. 
The isolation effect occurs when an individual discards components that are shared 
by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, an 
individual would react differently to the following two questions because of the isolation 
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effect. Both questions have two steps: first, the participant is given a bonus; second, the 
participant chooses between two options. 
Question 1: you have been given 1,000, which one do you prefer? 
A: (1,000, .50),  and  B: (500). 
Question 2: you have been given 2,000, which one do you prefer? 
C: (-1,000, .50),  and  D: (-500). 
If considering both steps of both questions, the utilities of both questions are equal. 
That is, the final wealth of A and C are equal, and the final wealth of B and D are equal. If 
participants integrate the bonus of the first step and the prospects of the second step, they 
should make similar decisions between question 1 and question 2. However, the results do 
not support this prediction. The results show that most participants prefer option B for 
question 1; whereas, most participants prefer option C for question 2, which means that the 
participants only compared the prospects of the second step and omitted the bonus of the 
first step. If only considering the second step, this change in preference is consistent with 
the reflection effect. Participants change their decisions when the outcomes change from 
gains to losses. Therefore, individuals are more concerned about the change of their wealth, 
rather than the final wealth. Expected utility theory cannot explain these behaviors. 
Because expected utility theory cannot explain the certainty, reflection and 
isolation effects, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop prospect theory. They argue that 
there are two phases in the process of decision making under risk: the editing phase and 
the evaluation phase. “The editing phase consists of a preliminary analysis of the offered 
prospects, which often yields a simpler representation of these prospects. In the second 
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phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect of highest value is chosen” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274).  
In the editing phase, individuals organize and reformulate the options in order to 
simplify subsequent evaluation and choice. There are six operations in this phase: coding, 
combination, segregation, cancellation, simplification, and detection of dominance. 
Coding is the operation in which individuals could perceive outcomes as gains or losses 
according to their reference point. The formulation of the offered prospects and the 
expectations of the decision maker influence the reference point. The reference point 
usually corresponds to the current asset position of the decision maker. Therefore, 
individuals’ coding of gains or losses is consistent with the actual amounts that are received 
or paid. Combination is the operation through which individuals could simplify prospects 
by combining the probabilities associated with identical outcomes. For example, the 
prospect (200, .25; 200, .25) will be simplified to (200, .50). Segregation is the operation 
through which individuals could segregate a riskless component from the risky component. 
For example, the prospect (300, .80; 200, .20) is seen as a sure gain of 200 and the risky 
prospect (100, .80). Cancellation is the operation through which individuals could discard 
the common constituents or the components that are shared by prospects. The isolation 
effect is the result of cancellation. Simplification is the operation through which individuals 
could simplify prospects by rounding probabilities or outcomes. Detection of dominance 
is the operation through which individuals could scan the prospects to detect dominant 
alternatives. For example, (500, .20; 101, .49) will dominate (500, .15; 99, .51) if 
individuals simplify the second outcome of both prospects to (100, .50) (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  
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The value function  
In the evaluation phase, individuals evaluate each of the edited prospects and 
choose the prospect of highest value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). To evaluate the overall 
value of an edited prospect, 𝑉, they introduce two scales, 𝜋 and 𝑣. “𝜋 associates with each 
probability 𝑝 a decision weight 𝜋(𝑝), which reflects the impact of 𝑝 on the over-all value 
of the prospect” and “𝑣  assigns to each outcome 𝑥  a number 𝑣(𝑥), which reflects the 
subjective value of that outcome” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 275).  Figure 5 shows 





Kahnman and Tversky (1979, p. 279) propose “that the value function is (i) defined 
on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly 
convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains.” 
Figure 4. A hypothetical value function.  
Adopted from “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk” by 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 47, p. 279.  
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There is a simple prospect (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞). In such a prospect, an individual receives 𝑥 
with probability  𝑝 , 𝑦  with probability 𝑞 , and nothing with probability 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑞 , 
where 𝑝 + 𝑞 ≤ 1. If both 𝑥 and 𝑦 are positive, the prospect is strictly positive. If x and y 
are negative, the prospect is strictly negative. If a prospect is neither strictly positive nor 
strictly negative, it is regular. Therefore, a regular prospect has at least one non-positive 
outcome and at least one nonnegative outcome. 
If (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) is a regular prospect, (i.e., 𝑝 + 𝑞 < 1, 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 0 ≥ 𝑦), 
then the overall value of the prospect is  
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) = 𝜋(𝑝)𝑣(𝑥) + 𝜋(𝑞)𝑣(𝑦)              ① 
Where 𝑣(0) = 0,  and  𝜋(. )  is weighting function 𝜋(0) = 0, and 𝜋(1) = 1 . I 
discuss the weighing function in detail below. 
If (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞)  is a strictly positive or negative prospect, 𝑝 + 𝑞 = 1, 𝑥 < 𝑦 <
0 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 𝑦 > 0, then the overall value of the prospect is  
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 𝑞) = 𝑣(𝑦) + 𝜋(𝑝)[𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑦)]              ② 
Equation ② shows the segregation operation. That is, the value of a strictly positive 
prospect equals the value of the smaller outcome plus the probability of the greater outcome 
times the difference of values between two outcomes. In other words, there is a prospect 
that has two possible gains, thus, people can achieve the lower gain for sure and get the 
higher gain for a chance (equal to the higher gain’s probability). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 278) “hypothesize that the value function for 
changes of wealth is normally concave above the reference point (𝑣′′(𝑥) < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 0) 
and often convex below it (𝑣′′(𝑥) > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0). That is, the marginal value of both gains 
and losses generally decreases with their magnitude.”  
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The weighting function  
Prospect theory relaxes the weighting of the values. Instead of probabilities, 
decision weights multiply the values of each outcome.  
Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects…However, 
decision weights are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability 
axioms and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 280). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop a weighting function 𝜋 , which relates 
decision weights to stated probabilities. Hence, 𝜋  is an increasing function of 𝑝 , with 
𝜋(0) = 0 and 𝜋(1) = 1. That is, individuals weight more of the events that have higher 
probability to occur. Individuals place a weight 0 on the events that would never occur and 
1 on the event that would always occur. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that small probabilities are generally over-
weighted and that the weighting function for small probabilities is a sub-additive function. 
That is 𝜋(𝑝) > 𝑝  and 𝜋(𝑟𝑝) > 𝑟𝜋(𝑝)  for small 𝑝 . Figure 6 shows a hypothetical 
weighting function. The solid line shows the subjective weighting and the dotted line shows 
the 45-degree line. If the solid line is above the dotted line, the subjective weighting is 
higher than the probability. If the solid line is under the dotted line, the subjective weighting 
is lower than the probability. Figure 6 shows that individuals tend to overweight small 
probability and underweight medium and large probability. 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also note the weighting function does not work very 
well near the end points, where 𝜋(0) = 0 and 𝜋(1) = 1. “Because people are limited in 
their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are 
either ignored or overweighed, and the difference between high probability and certainty 
is either neglected or exaggerated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283). They also 
provide an interesting example: 
The following example, due to Zeckhauser, illustrates the hypothesized 
nonlinearity of 𝜋. Suppose you are compelled to play Russian roulette, but are 
given the opportunity to purchase the removal of one bullet from the loaded 
gun. Would you pay as much to reduce the number of bullets from four to three 
as you would to reduce the number of bullets from one to zero? Most people 
feel that they would be willing to pay much more for a reduction of the 
probability of death from 1/6 to zero than for a reduction from 4/6 to 3/6. 
Economic considerations would lead one to pay more in the latter case, where 
the value of money is presumably reduced by the considerable probability that 
one will not live to enjoy it. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283) 
 
Figure 5. A hypothetical weighting function.  
Adopted from “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk” by 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 47, p. 283. 
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Cumulative Prospect Theory 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed a new version of prospect theory, 
cumulative prospect theory, which can apply to more than two prospects under risk and 
uncertainty. Cumulative prospect theory also differentiates between the value function and 
weighting for gains and losses.  
Cumulative prospect theory introduces two principles, diminishing sensitivity and 
loss aversion, to explain individuals’ behavior when making decisions. Diminishing 
sensitivity refers to the fact that “the impact of a change diminishes with the distance from 
the reference point” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303). Loss aversion refers to “losses 
loom larger than corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303). 
The diminishing sensitivity applies to both value functions and weighting functions. 
“In evaluation of outcomes, the reference point serves as a boundary that distinguishes 
gains from losses” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 303). 
The value function of Cumulative prospect theory is: 
𝑣(𝑥) = {
𝑥𝛼 , 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛼, 𝑥 < 0
    















The experimental results of (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) show that 𝛼 is 0.88, 𝜆 is 
2.25, 𝜔+  is 0.61 and 𝜔− is 0.69. The results also show there are four patterns of risk 
attitudes: risk aversion for gains of high probability; risk seeking for gains of low 
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probability; risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk aversion for losses of low 
probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 316) propose cumulative prospect theory as a 
“descriptive theory in which 1) the objects of choice are prospects framed in terms of gains 
and losses, 2) the valuation rule is a two-part cumulative functional, and 3) the value 
function is S-shaped and the weighting functions are inverse S-shaped”. 
Scholars have found cumulative prospect theory can explain decision making 
phenomena in many fields better than EU (Barberis, 2013; Camerer, 2004). See the 
Appendix A for a summary. 
Dual-Process Theory 
Wason and Evans (1975) first advanced the dual-process theory in 1975. They 
found there is a dual processing between behavior and conscious thought when individuals 
are making decisions. They provided two different underlying processes: a performance 
process and an introspection process. “The processes underlying reasoning performance, 
e.g., matching bias, are not generally available for introspective report” and “Introspection 
accounts of performance reflect a tendency for the subject to construct a justification for 
his own behavior consistent with his knowledge of the situation” (Wason & Evans, 1975, 




Different Labels for System 1 and System 2 
System 1 System 2  
Automatic Controlled (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) 
Heuristic Analytic (Evans, 1984) 
Implicit Explicit (Reber & Squire, 1994) 
Experiential Rational (Epstein, 1994) 
Intuitive Analytic (Hammond, 1996) 
Associative Rule-based (Sloman, 1996) 
System 1 System 2 (Stanovich, 1999) 
Holistic Analytic (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) 
Reflexive Reflective (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004) 
Conscious Unconscious (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) 
 
Evans (2008) provided four clusters of difference between these two systems: 
consciousness, evolution, functional characteristics and individual differences. First, 
System 1 is largely unconscious; whereas, System 2 is consciously accessible. Second, 
System 1 evolved earlier than System 2. Third, System 1 is rapid and automatic whereas 
System 2 is slow and controlled. Fourth, there is little between-individual variation of 
System 1 because it is independent of general intelligence and working memory. However, 
there is more between-individual variation of System 2 because of individuals’ capacity 
and ability. See Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Clusters of Attributes Associated with Dual Systems of Thinking 
System 1 System 2 
Cluster 1 (Consciousness) 
Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious 
Implicit Explicit 
Automatic Controlled 
Low effort High effort 
Rapid Slow 
High capacity Low capacity 
Default process Inhibitory 
Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reflective 
Cluster 2 (Evolution) 
Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent 
Evolutionarily rationality Individual rationality 
Shared with animals Uniquely human 
Nonverbal Linked to language 
Modular cognition Fluid intelligence 
Cluster 3 (Functional characteristics) 
Associative Rule based 





Cluster 4 (Individual differences) 
Universal Heritable 
Independent of general intelligence Linked to general intelligence 
Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity 
(Evans, 2008, p. 261)  
 
Early work on dual-process theory focused on the details of the properties of each 
system, however, recent research has shifted to understand how these systems work 
together (Salas et al., 2010). It is very rare for an individual to make a decision only based 
on one system. System 1 and System 2 are functioning in parallel and interacting when an 
individual makes decisions. System 2 can evaluate the results of System 1. For example, 
the heuristic judgments associated with System 1 will lead to biases. However, analytic 
reasoning, which is associated with System 2, may intervene with the heuristic judgment 
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to improve them and mitigate biases (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The interaction 
between the two systems can generally be framed as “System 1 subservience to System 2” 
(Salas et al., 2010, p. 946). That is, the results from System 1 serve as inputs of System 2, 
and then System 2 mitigates biases, adjusts direction or rejects the results of System 1.  
There are other different perspectives about the relationship between two systems. 
For example, Haidt (2001) provides an “emotional dog” model to explain the behaviors of 
individuals when they are facing ethical questions by using dual-process theory. In this 
model, System 1 dominates the processing of moral judgments. The job of System 2 is 
primarily to find the rationalization of the moral decision. The role of the rationalization is 
to convince the decision makers that they have made right decisions. Moreover, these 
rationalizations rarely change the initial judgment of System 1. 
Hypotheses Development  
People may have different subjective values for opportunities. Both the differences 
among opportunities and the differences among individuals may influence their subjective 
evaluations of opportunities. Scholars have tested the positive relationship between the 
elements of opportunity and the subjective value of opportunity in different perspectives. 
The higher the probability of the opportunity is, the greater the subjective value of the 
opportunity is. In addition, the higher the outcome of the opportunity is, the greater the 
subjective value of the opportunity is. In the dissertation, I focus on the moderators of these 
relationships. 
Prospect theory argues individuals have different subjective values for the same 
outcome based on their reference points (value function, parameter 𝑎). A reference point 
is the distinction between gains and losses. Individuals could change their attitude that they 
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weigh losses more than gains (loss aversion index, parameter 𝜆). Individuals also have their 
own weighting function (parameters:𝑘+, 𝑘−), which over-weights small probabilities and 
underweights medium and large probabilities. Therefore parameters 𝑎, 𝜆, 𝑘+, 𝑘−  will 
determine an individual’s subjective evaluation of risky decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). The parameter 𝑎 determines the shape of a subjective value curve. The subjective 
value will be closer to the expected value when 𝑎 is closer to 1. The subjective value will 
equal the expected value when 𝑎 equal to 1. The parameter 𝜆 determines the loss aversion. 
The loss aversion will be less when 𝜆 is closer to 1. There will be no loss aversion when 𝜆 
equals 1, which means an individual has the same subjective value for gains and losses. 
The parameters 𝑘+, 𝑘− determine the shape of the weighting function curve. The weighting 
function will be closer to probability when 𝑘+  and 𝑘−  are closer to 1. The weighting 
function will equal to probability when 𝑘+ and 𝑘− are equal to 1. That is, the curve of the 
weighting function will become a straight line and all subjective weighting of probabilities 
equal to the actual probabilities. 
Hypothesis 1: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between 
the elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value 
of the opportunity; that is, the subjective value of the opportunity will be higher 
when the opportunity can be described in a loss frame rather than in a gain 
frame. 
Based on prospect theory, the subjective value of the opportunity equals the product 
of the subjective value function and the weighting function. I used the natural logarithm to 
transform the multiplication into a linear relation. Therefore, 
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
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𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑎 ln 𝑥 
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑝) = ln
𝑝𝜔




Based on the experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), here 𝑎 =
0.88, 𝜔 = 0.66, 𝑥 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
Hypothesis 1a: The LnEvaluation will be higher when the opportunity is 
described in loss frame than in gain frame. 
Hypothesis 1b: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between 
the LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be 
higher when the opportunity is described in loss frame than in gain frame. 
Hypothesis 1c: The framing of opportunity moderates the relationship between 
the LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be 
higher when the opportunity is described in loss frame than in gain frame. 
Entrepreneurship is the process of identification, evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities and it involves the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012). Entrepreneurial opportunities are “those situations in 
which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and 
sold at greater than their cost of production” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 220). 
However, because of bounded rationality, entrepreneurs may not realize the objective value 
of opportunities. They may generate different subjective values based on their intuition that 
originates in System 1. “When there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be wrong, 
System 2 can impose a different strategy, replacing intuition by careful reasoning” 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 519). The interactions between System 1 and System 2 are 
complex. However, dual-process theory argues that System 1 is subservient to System 2. 
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The analytic thinking can evaluate the product of intuitive processing, uncover new 
information that is acted on by the intuitive system, and generate post hoc rationalizations 
for moral judgment (Salas et al., 2010). Therefore, an individual’s subjective values for an 
opportunity will be lower when they use more System 1 than System 2. 
Hypothesis 2: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the 
elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value of 
the opportunity; that is, the subjective value of the opportunity will be higher 
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking. 
To be more specific,  
Hypothesis 2a: The LnEvaluation will be higher when people use more System 
2 thinking than System 1 thinking. 
Hypothesis 2b: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the 
LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be higher 
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking. 
Hypothesis 2c: The style of thinking moderates the relationship between the 
LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be higher 
when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking. 
Dual process theory argues that the rapid and unconscious processing of System 1 
is based on past experience (Salas et al., 2010). From running their businesses, 
entrepreneurs gain experience about markets, customers, technologies, and organizing. 
This experience can help them make decisions about opportunities. For example, repeat 
entrepreneurs discover more valuable opportunities than nascent entrepreneurs (Fiet, 
Clouse, & Norton, 2004), entrepreneurs can discover different opportunities based on their 
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experience (Shane, 2000), experience can help entrepreneurs better understand 
opportunities that they are facing (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005), and habitual 
entrepreneurs, especially those who have experienced failure, are less over-optimistic 
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & Flores, 2010). On the other hand, non-entrepreneurs are 
more likely to be inaccurate when estimating the values of opportunities because they lack 
experience. Thus non-entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations will deviate more from 
objective values than those of entrepreneurs. Scholars have found that analysis can improve 
entrepreneurial performance. For example, Delmar and Shane (2003) have found that 
business planning can help entrepreneurs’ decision making concerning venture 
development. Patel and Fiet (2009) have found that systematic search can improve an 
entrepreneur’s decision making concerning firm founding. Therefore, entrepreneurs will 
generate lower subjective values than non-entrepreneurs who do not have prior knowledge 
regarding opportunities. 
Hypothesis 3: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between 
the elements of opportunity (outcome and probability) and the subjective value 
of the opportunity; that is, non-entrepreneurs have higher subjective evaluations 
of opportunities than entrepreneurs.  
To be more specific,  
Hypothesis 3a: The LnEvaluation will be higher for non-entrepreneurs than for 
entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 3b: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between 
the LnSubOutcome and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvalation will be higher 
for non-entrepreneurs than for entrepreneurs. 
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Hypothesis 3c: The status of entrepreneurs moderates the relationship between 
the LnSubProbability and the LnEvaluation; that is, the LnEvaluation will be 
higher for non-entrepreneurs than for entrepreneurs. 
 
Figure 7 shows the hypothetical model of H1 to H3. 
 
Why some people become entrepreneurs while others do not is a central question 
in entrepreneurship. Scholars have looked for the answers for decades (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997; Shane, 2012). Recently, they have found systematic cognitive differences in 
entrepreneurial decision making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Alvarez et 
al., 2013). However, there is still a question left: are these differences the ones that drive 
people to become entrepreneurs or the results of entrepreneurial practice? We cannot settle 
this argument by simply examining the differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs because we would observe the differences between them in either situation.  
I develop a new method to test this argument. I examine the differences among non-
entrepreneurs, nascent entrepreneurs, and experienced entrepreneurs, instead of the 
Figure 6. Hypothetical model of H1 to H3. 















differences just between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are 
in the process of starting their first businesses.  Experienced entrepreneurs have started a 
business more than one year and/or started more than one business. Experienced 
entrepreneurs have more entrepreneurial experience than nascent entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, experienced entrepreneurs have more experience starting and running a 
business and possibly even failure of a business.  
Consequently, if these cognitive differences in decision-making are the ones that 
drive people to become entrepreneurs, we should observe a significant difference in 
cognitive decision-making between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  At the same 
time, we should observe no significant difference between nascent entrepreneurs and 
experienced entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities are 
different from those of non-entrepreneurs; however, nascent entrepreneurs’ 
subjective evaluations of opportunities would not be different from those of 
experienced entrepreneurs. 
If these cognitive differences in decision-making result from entrepreneurial 
practice, we should observe significant differences in cognitive decision-making between 
nascent entrepreneurs; at same time, we should observe no significant difference between 
non-entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities 
are not different from those of non-entrepreneurs; however, nascent 
entrepreneurs’ subjective evaluations of opportunities would be different from 
those of experienced entrepreneurs. 
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
 
Chapter Overview 
To test the hypotheses, I have designed a 2x2x2 experimental study. In this chapter, 
I provide the details of my research design and survey design. 
Research Design 
The empirical tests of prospect theory usually ask participants their preferences 
between pairs of gambling choices. However, choosing from a pair of gambling choices 
cannot fully reflect a participant’s subjective evaluation. For example, when comparing 
choice A and B, Participant M may think that choice A is much better than B.  Participant 
N may think that choice A is a little better than B. The result is that both Participant M and 
N will choose A. The result cannot reflect the strength of the participants’ preferences. 
Therefore, this kind of design loses the variance of participants’ subjective evaluation. 
In this study, I asked participants to report their subjective evaluation of different 
business scenarios. By this design, I can determine the parameters in prospect theory that 
are different among people. Therefore, I can test decision making between and within 
different groups of entrepreneurs. Specifically, I can test whether entrepreneurs make 
different decisions than non-entrepreneurs when they are facing the same opportunity, 
whether entrepreneurs make different decisions when they rely more on System 1 than 
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System 2, and whether entrepreneurs make different decisions when they are under a gain-
frame than under a loss-frame. 
This study is a 2x2x2 experimental study: non-entrepreneurs vs. entrepreneurs, 
System 1 vs. System 2 thinking, and gain-frame vs. loss-frame. Among entrepreneurs, I 
also divided them into two subgroups: nascent entrepreneurs and repeat entrepreneurs. 
An experimental manipulation can provide two important advantages for a research 
design. First, the manipulation can present strong evidence of causality. The experimenter 
can change the independent variables in a systematic way. If the dependent variables 
change right after the manipulations and are significantly related to the manipulation, we 
have strong evidence that the independent variables are the cause of dependent variables. 
Second, the manipulation can mitigate endogeneity. Manipulation allows us to control 
extraneous variables by varying the variables we are interested in while keeping extraneous 
variables at similar levels. In this study, I manipulated independent variables, which are 
the probability and outcome of venture ideas, and moderators, which are participants’ 
styles of thinking and the ways to describe the opportunities.  
Independent variable: Probability and outcome of opportunities. In this study, 
I focus on two elements of opportunities: probability and outcome. I manipulated 
probability in 5 levels (5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95%) and outcome in 4 levels ($100,000, 
$200,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000). I discuss the design later in this dissertation. 
Dependent variable: The subjective value of opportunities. I examined directly 
the participants’ subjective evaluation of venture ideas.  
Moderators. Moderators include System 1 vs. System 2 thinking, gain vs. loss 
frame, and entrepreneurs vs. non-entrepreneurs. 
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System 1 vs. System 2 thinking manipulation. To manipulate intuitive or analytic 
thinking, this study followed Zhong’s (2011) method. Prior research has shown that 
calculating math problems can manipulate participants’ System 1 thinking whereas 
examining feelings can manipulate their System 2 thinking (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; 
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Zhong, 2011). To manipulate System 1 or System 2 
thinking, this study asked participants to answer questions about their feelings or calculate 
math questions.  
Gain vs. loss frame manipulation. This study used the maximum willingness to 
pay (gain frame) and minimum willingness to accept (loss frame) framework to manipulate 
gain and loss frames (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2008). In gain frame, 
respondents were told there is a venture idea that has p probability of success and it will 
earn m profit if it succeeds. The respondents answered the maximum amount of money 
they would pay to buy the idea. Whereas in loss frame, respondents were told they have a 
venture idea that has p probability of success and it will earn m profit if it succeeds. The 
respondents answered the minimum amount of money they would be willing to sell the 
idea.  
Sample size. I used two software programs, Optimal Design (Raudenbush, 2011) 
and PowerUp! (Dong & Maynard, 2013), to calculate the minimum required sample size. 
Both of them report the appropriate sample size is 200, when the anticipated effect size 
is .2 (small) and the expected intra-class correlation (ICC) is .2. Therefore, I collected 100 
entrepreneur samples for Experiment 1 and 100 general population samples for Experiment 
2. Then I combined two samples to test my hypotheses. 
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Experiment 1  
I used a sample of real entrepreneurs. See chapter 4 for how the sample of real 
entrepreneurs was assembled.  
The participants were randomly assigned to two groups: Group A and Group B. 
Participants in Group A took System 1 manipulation and then evaluated venture scenarios. 
Participants in Group B took System 2 manipulation and then evaluated venture scenarios. 
Each group was randomly divided into two subgroups: Subgroup 1 and Subgroup 2. 
Participants in Subgroup 1 evaluated scenarios in order 1 and participants in Subgroup 2 
evaluated scenarios in order 2. Each subgroup was randomly divided into two subgroups: 
Subgroup I and Subgroup II. Participants in Subgroup I evaluated scenarios in Gain frame 
first then evaluated scenarios in Loss frame. Participants in Subgroup II evaluated scenarios 
in Loss frame first then evaluated scenarios Gain in frame. Finally, all participants 
answered demographic questions.  
An opportunity’s value is based on two variables: the probability of success and 
payoff. To test the subjective value function, I fixed the probability at 25% and varied the 
payoffs. Because the subjective value function is concave in the gain frame and convex in 
the loss frame, I need at least 4 observations in each frame. Thus, the payoffs were 
$100,000, $200,000, $500,000, and $1,000,000. To test the subjective weighting function, 
I fixed the payoff to $200,000 and varied the probability of success. Because the subjective 
weighting function is an inverse “S” shape curve, I need at least five observations. Thus, 
the probabilities were 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%. The two parts shared a scenario (25%, 
$200,000); therefore, there were eight different scenarios. Each scenario was repeated 
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twice in the Gain frame and the Loss frame. Therefore, each participant evaluated 16 
scenarios of venture ideas.  
A sample of the Gain frame scenario: 
There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $100,000 payoff and 
75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy 
this idea. 
A sample of the Loss frame scenario: 
You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 
95% chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount for which you 
will sell this idea. 
At the end of the experiment, I asked questions of control variables and 
demographic questions. 
Figure 8 shows the survey flow. 
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I used a general population sample to repeat the Experiment 1 to test whether there 
are differences between non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs.  
Survey Design 
To manipulate System 1 thinking or System 2 thinking, I asked participants to 
answer five questions about their feeling or to calculate five questions (Zhong, 2011). I list 
the manipulation questions below. 
Manipulation of System 1 thinking  
We are interested in people’s impressions of public figures. Please base your 
answers to the following questions on the feelings you experience.  
When you hear the name "George Clooney", what do you feel? Please use one word 
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________. 
When you hear the name "George W. Bush", what do you feel? Please use one word 
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________. 
When you hear the name "Princess Diana", what do you feel? Please use one word 
to describe your predominant feeling: ____________. 
When you hear the words "9/11", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe 
your predominant feeling: ____________. 
When you hear the word "baby", what do you feel? Please use one word to describe 
your predominant feeling: ____________. 
Manipulation of System 2 thinking 
We are interested in the people’s calculations of word problems. Please work 
carefully and deliberately to calculate the answers to the questions posed below.  
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If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet 
will it travel in 360 seconds? ______ feet 
Suppose a student bought a pen and a pencil for a total of $11, and that the pen 
cost $10 more than the pencil. Then, by your calculations how much did the pencil cost? 
______ 
If a consumer bought 30 books for $540, then, by your calculations, on average, 
how much did the consumer pay for each book? $____  
If a baker bought nine pounds of flour at $1.50 per pound, then, by your 
calculations how much did the baker pay in total? $____  
If a company bought 15 computers for $1200 each, then, by your calculations, how 
much did the company pay in total? $____   
Scenarios 
To examine participants’ subjective values of opportunities, I asked participants to 
evaluate different scenarios of venture ideas. To manipulate gain frame, I asked 
participants to write down the maximum price to buy the venture ideas. To manipulate loss 
frame, I asked participants to write down the minimum price to sell the venture ideas. I list 
the scenarios of venture ideas below.  
Gain frame 
Scenario 1. There is a venture idea which has a 5% chance to 
earn a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance to get a $0 payoff. Please 
tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
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Scenario 2. There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
earn a $100,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 3. There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
earn a $200,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 4. There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
earn a $500,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 5. There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
earn a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell 
us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 6. There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to 
earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 7. There is a venture idea which has a 75% chance to 
earn a $200,000 payoff and a 25% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
Scenario 8. There is a venture idea which has a 95% chance to 
earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
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Loss frame 
Scenario 1. You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to 
get a $200,000 payoff and a 95% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 2. You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
get a $100,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 3. You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
get a $200,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 4. You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
get a $500,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 5. You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to 
get a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 6. You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to 
get a $200,000 payoff and a 50% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
Scenario 7. You have a venture idea which has a 75% chance to 
get a $200,000 payoff and a 25% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us 
the minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
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Scenario 8. You have a venture idea which has a 95% chance to 
get a $200,000 payoff and a 5% to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the 
minimum amount you will sell this idea. 
 
Manipulation check 
I used two 7-point Likert Scale questions to check the manipulation of different 
styles of thinking. I list them below. 
Please indicate that how you evaluate the above venture ideas: 
I made my decision fast, intuitively and unconsciously.  
I made my decision slowly, analytically and consciously.  
 









I ran three different models to test my hypotheses. First, I ran a model that included 
all samples to test the moderation effects of entrepreneur, different types of frames, and 
different styles of thinking. Second, I ran a model that only included non-entrepreneurs and 
nascent entrepreneurs to test the difference between them. Third, I ran a model that only 
includes entrepreneurs to test the moderation effect of their entrepreneurial experience. 
Data 
I sent my survey through Qualtics.com. Qualtrics is a world leading survey 
technology provider. They sent the survey to entrepreneurs and general population. 
Entrepreneurs are those who have started at least one business and are currently running a 
business. General population is American Adult. There were 277 people who participated 
in the survey. There were 130 entrepreneurs and 147 non-entrepreneurs. I checked whether 
participants entered valid data based on three rules. First, some participants finished the 
survey in an unreasonably short time. The average time of completion for this survey was 
13 minutes. I treated the participants as invalid if they finished survey within five minutes. 
Second, some participants consistently entered same numbers for the evaluations. There 
were four questions of evaluations on each screen when the participant took the survey. 
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Therefore, I treated the participants as invalid if they entered same numbers for more than 
four evaluations. Third, some participants entered non-sensible answers. These 
respondents just did not seem to make sense in their answers to my questions. They 
included percentage, etc. in response to questions of evaluations. Among all participants, 
184 people provided valid data. There were 101 entrepreneurs and 83 non-entrepreneurs. 
To further check the validity of participants, I checked the correlations between 
their evaluations of gain frames and loss frames. The mean of their reliability is .60, the 
median is .72, and the standard deviation is .40. I used .50 as a threshold of reliability to 
screen out the participants who have low reliabilities (Holland & Shepherd, 2013). There 
were 125 participants who had reliabilities greater than .50. There were 66 entrepreneurs 





  Full sample Valid data Reliable data 
  f % f % f % 
Entrepreneur Yes 130 46.9 101 54.9 66 52.8 
No 147 53.1 83 45.1 59 47.2 
Gender Male 125 45.1 85 46.2 59 47.2 
Female  152 54.9 99 53.8 66 52.8 
Race White/Caucasian 189 68.2 127 69.0 95 76.0 
African American 39 14.1 24 13.0 13 10.4 
Hispanic 24 8.7 20 10.9 11 8.8 
Asian 13 4.7 5 2.7 4 3.2 
Native American 4 1.4 2 1.6 1 0.8 
Other 8 2.9 5 2.7 1 0.8 
Education Less than High School 8 2.9 5 2.7 4 3.2 
High School / GED 54 19.5 37 20.1 24 19.2 
Some College 89 32.1 58 31.5 41 32.8 
2-year College Degree 33 11.9 18 9.8 13 10.4 
4-year College Degree 69 24.9 50 27.2 34 27.2 
Master Degree 17 6.1 12 6.5 7 5.6 
Doctoral Degree 3 1.1 3 1.6 1 0.8 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) 4 1.4 1 0.5 1 0.8 
 
 
HLM Model 1: Entrepreneurs vs. Non-Entrepreneurs 
Because decisions are nested within entrepreneurs, I used HLM 7 (Raudenbush, 
Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011) to test my hypotheses. HLM has several merits 
in multi-level analysis. First, I can determine whether OLS regression’s independence of 
responses assumption is violated to see if I need to use a multi-level model. Second, I can 
examine the effect of controls prior to entering hypothesized variables. Third, I can 
calculate the percent of variance explained by the controls, direct effects, and moderators 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To linearize the model, I used the natural logarithm function. 
Therefore,  
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
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𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑎 ln 𝑥 
𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑝) = ln
𝑝𝜔




Based on the experimental results of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), here 𝑎 =
0.88, 𝜔 = 0.66, 𝑥 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
Table 5 shows the HLM variables. There are two types of methods in HLM based 
on different types of likelihood of analysis: restricted maximum likelihood (REML) and 
full maximum likelihood (FIML). In practice, both methods lead to similar results (Kreft, 
De Leeuw, & Kim, 1990). However, if the number of level-2 groups is small, FIML has a 
downward bias, which estimates for variance components tend to be smaller than the 
REML estimates (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Because the number of level-2 groups of 
my data was bigger than 30, I used FIML to analyze the models. There were 1,914 
evaluations nested within 125 individuals. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of HLM Model 1. 
First, I ran a null model that only includes the dependent variable and does not 
include any independent variables. The intra-class correlation (ICC) is 68.0%. That is, 68.0% 
of variance of subjective values can be explained by the difference among individuals. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to use a multi-level model to analyze the data. Table 7 shows 





Variable Coding Centering  Variable type 
Level-1 variables  
LnEvaluation Monetary  DV 
LnSubOutcome Monetary Grand centered IV 
LnSubProbability Percent Grand centered IV 
Frame 0: Loss frame 
1: Gain frame 
Uncentered M(H1) 
Frame*LnSubOut  Grand centered M(H1) 
Frame*LnSubPr  Grand centered M(H1) 
Level-2 variables  
Age Years Grand centered CV 
Gender 0: Female 
1: Male 
Uncentered CV 
System 0: System 1 
1: System 2 
Uncentered M(H2) 






1: Nascent entrepreneur 
Uncentered M(H4) 
Experience Years Grand centered M(H5) 
Note. DV = Dependent variable, IV = Independent variable, CV = Control variable,  







Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 1 
  Mean SD  Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 LnEvaluation 9.665 2.636 1            
2 LnSubOutcome 10.945 0.581 .150 *** 1           
3 LnSubProbability -1.052 0.538 .242 *** -.113 *** 1          
4 Frame 0.496 0.500 -.054 ** .001 .004  1        
5 Entrepreneur 0.488 0.500 -.133 *** -.003 .009  -.012  1      
6 System 0.426 0.495 .077 ** -.005 .000  -.010  .043 1     
7 Age 37.983 15.408 -.159 *** -.002 .012  .005  -.001 -.015 1    
8 Gender 0.471 0.500 -.096 *** .003 -.007  .006  -.073 ** -.073 ** .016  1  
9 Frame*LnSubOut 0.003 0.409 .105 *** .703 *** -.081 *** .007  -.005  -.002  .000  .003 1 
10 Frame*LnSubPr 0.005 0.380 .168 *** -.081 *** .703 *** .001  .013  .004  .007  -.004 -.115 *** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
N = 1,914. 






HLM Results of Model 1 
 Null model Level-1 IV model Control model Final model   
Fixed effects Coefficient (SE) Cohen’s d Effect size 
LnEvaluation, β0           
Intercept, γ00 9.65(0.20) *** 9.62(0.20) *** 9.63(0.20) *** 10.02(0.32) ***   
Age, γ01     -0.03(0.01) * -0.03(0.01) * .01 Very small 
Entrepreneur, γ02       -0.78(0.39) * .30 Small 
System, γ03       0.34(0.39)    
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1           
Intercept, γ10   0.85(0.06) *** 0.84(0.06) *** 0.78(0.09) *** .29 Very small  
Age, γ11     -0.01(0.00) # -0.01(0.00) * .00 Very small 
Entrepreneur, γ12       -0.05(0.11)    
System, γ13       0.22(0.11) * .08 Very small 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2           
Intercept, γ20   1.42(0.09) *** 1.42(0.09) *** 1.45(0.15) *** .55 Medium  
Entrepreneur, γ21       -0.09(0.19)    
System, γ22       0.13(0.19)    
For Frame slope, β3           
Intercept, γ30       -0.34(0.12) ** .13 Very small 
Random effects Variance component (SD)   
LnEvaluation, u0 4.74(2.18) *** 4.92(2.22) *** 4.74(2.18) *** 4.94(2.22) ***   
LnSubOutcome slope, u1   0.18(0.42) *** 0.16(0.40) *** 0.23(0.48) ***   
LnSubProbability slope, u2   0.83(0.91) *** 0.83(0.91) *** 0.95(0.98) ***   
Frame slope, u3       1.48(1.22) ***   
Level-1, r 2.24(1.50)  1.19(1.09)  1.09(1.09)  0.71(0.84)    
Deviance 7416.21  6497.52  6569.57  5953.24    
Estimated parameters 3  10  12  23    
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Cohen’s d effect size scale: 0.00 to 0.29 = very small; 0.30 to 0.49 = small; 0.50 to 0.79 = medium; and over 0.80 = large (Cohen, 1988). 
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Second, I added the independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability) 
into the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see 
Table 7) indicated that they are all statistically significant; therefore, I keep them random 
in the model to get the Level-1 IV model.  
Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to 
the level-2 intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically non-significant level-2 
effects (p > .100) to get the final control model. As shown in Table 8, only Age significantly 
influences the intercept of DV and the slope of LnSubOutcome.   
 
Table 8 
Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
LnEvaluation, β0     
Intercept, γ00 9.389 0.269 <0.001  
Age, γ01 -0.027 0.012 0.036 Kept 
Gender, γ02 0.508 0.391 0.196 Removed 
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1     
Intercept, γ10 0.850 0.077 <0.001  
Age, γ11 -0.007 0.004 0.062 Kept 
Gender, γ12 -0.013 0.113 0.910 Removed 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2     
Intercept, γ20 1.335 0.129 <0.001  
Age, γ21 -0.005 0.006 0.403 Removed 
Gender, γ22 0.181 0.189 0.341 Removed 
 
 
 Fourth, I added level-1 moderators (Frame, Frame*LnSubOut, and 
Frame*LnSubPr) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant 
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in 




Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 1 
Moderator Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
Frame -0.343 0.118 .004 Kept 
Frame*LnSubOut -0.018 0.064 .776 Removed 
Frame*LnSubPr -0.004 0.104 .972 Removed 
 
Fifth, I tested my final model by adding the level-2 moderators (Entrepreneur and 
System). I added Entrepreneur and System as predictors of the intercept and slopes 
(LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). I calculated effect sizes of the final model by 
using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), 𝑑 =
𝛾
√𝜏00+𝜎2
. The final model is as follows:  
Level-1 Model 
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) + 
β3j*(Frameij) + rij  
Level-2 Model 
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Agej) + γ01*(Entrepreneurj) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Agej) + γ12*(Entrepreneurj) + γ13*(Systemj) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Entrepreneurj) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j  
β3j = γ30 + u3j  
 
The HLM results for the final model (see Table 7) indicate that the Frame has a 
moderate effect on the dependent variable. That is, the average natural logarithm of 
subjective evaluations of gain frame is 0.34 less than that of loss frame. Therefore, H1a is 
supported, that is the Frame moderates the relationship between the opportunity and the 
subjective value of the opportunity. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating effect is very 
small. The System has a moderating effect on the slope of LnSubOutcome. That is, the slope 
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of nature logarithm of subjective outcome is 0.22 greater when participants use more 
System 2 thinking than when participants use more System 1 thinking. Therefore, H2b is 
supported, that is the type of thinking moderates the relationship between the opportunity 
and the subjective value of the opportunity. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating effect 
is very small. The Entrepreneur has a direct effect on the intercept of dependent variable, 
LnEvaluation. That is, the average nature logarithm of subjective evaluations of 
entrepreneurs is 0.78 smaller than that of non-entrepreneurs when everything else is equal. 
Therefore, the H3a is supported, that is non-entreprepeurs have higher subjective 
evaluations of opportunities than entrepreneurs. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating 
effect is small. There is no moderation effect on the slope of LnSubProbability for 
entrepreneurs or for differing systems (see Table 7).  
The results show that entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than non-entrepreneurs. 
Figure 8 shows the means of evaluations of each scenario. Most of the evaluations are 
lower than the expected values. Therefore, the evaluations of entrepreneurs are lower than 
non-entrepreneurs means that the evaluations of entrepreneurs are more divergent from the 
expected values.  
The results show that the different types of thinking influence the subjective values 
of outcomes. People’s subjective values of outcomes are higher when they use more 
System 2 thinking than when they use more System 1 thinking. That is, people will evaluate 
opportunities close to the expected values when they use more System 2 thinking. This 
result is consistent with dual-process theory. 
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The results show that people’s evaluations of gain frame are lower than those of 




Means of evaluations 
 
HLM Model 2: Nascent Entrepreneurs vs. Non-Entrepreneurs 
In model 2, I only included non-entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs. There 
were 63 non-entrepreneurs who completed 981 evaluations and 14 nascent entrepreneurs 
who completed 217 evaluations. Totally 217 individuals completed 1198 evaluations. I 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Scenarios
Means of Evaluations
Expected Value Non-Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
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First, I ran a null model that only includes dependent variable and does not include 
any independent variables. The ICC is 60.3%. That is, 60.3% of variance of subjective 
values can be explained by the difference among individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to use a multi-level model to analyze the data.  
Second, I added the independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability) 
into the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see 
Table 11) indicated that they are all statistically significant; therefore, I kept them random 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 2 
  Mean SD Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 LnEvaluation 9.857 2.387 1              
2 LnSubOutcome 10.946 0.584 .174 *** 1             
3 LnSubProbabilty -1.056 0.536 .281 *** -.111 *** 1            
4 Frame 0.498 0.500 -.065 * -.003 .000  1          
5 Nascent  0.181 0.385 -.135 *** -.003 .000  -.014  1        
6 System 0.434 0.496 .158 *** -.009 -.012  -.007  .122 *** 1       
7 Age 37.258 15.295 -.103 *** .000 .009  .009  -.102 *** -.010 1      
8 Gender 0.455 0.498 -.161 *** .000 -.012  .005  -.221 *** -.113 *** .036  1    
9 Frame*LnSubOut 0.004 .413 .115 *** .707 *** -.079 ** .009  -.004  -.006  -.001  .001  1  
10 Frame*LnSubPr -0.003 .379 .199 *** -.079 ** .707 *** -.008  .007  -.006  .005  -.006  -.111 *** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
N = 1,198. 






HLM Results of Model 2 
 Null model Level-1 IV model Control model Final model   
Fixed effects Coefficient (SE) Cohen’s d Effect size 
LnEvaluation, β0           
Intercept, γ00 9.85(0.22) *** 9.84(0.22) *** 9.53(0.27) *** 9.59(0.33) ***   
Gender, γ01     0.69(0.35)  0.52(0.35)    
Nascent, γ02       -0.74(0.55) ** .31 Small 
System, γ03       0.75(0.42)    
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1           
Intercept, γ10   0.87(0.07) *** 0.85(0.06) *** 0.71(0.09) *** .30 Small  
Nascent, γ11       0.11(0.16)    
System, γ12       0.34(0.13) * .14 Very small 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2           
Intercept, γ20   1.45(0.12) *** 1.43(0.09) *** 1.42(0.17) *** .60 Medium  
Nascent, γ21       -0.26(0.31)    
System, γ22       0.22(0.25)    
For Frame slope, β3           
Intercept, γ30       -0.35(0.14) ** .15 Very small 
Random effects Variance component (SD)   
LnEvaluation, u0 3.43(1.85) *** 3.57(1.89) *** 3.42(1.85) *** 3.38(1.84) ***   
LnSubOutcome slope, u1   0.14(0.37) *** 0.14(0.37) *** 0.16(0.41) ***   
LnSubProbability slope, u2   0.87(0.93) *** 0.87(0.93) *** 0.98(0.99) ***   
Frame slope, u3       1.21(1.10) ***   
Level-1, r 2.26(1.50)  1.16(1.08)  1.16(1.08)  0.76(0.87)    
Deviance 4621.74  3995.74  3991.96  3714.53    
Estimated parameters 3  10  11  22    
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 




Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to 
the model to predict the intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically non-
significant level-2 effects (p > .100) to get the final control model (see Table 12). The 




Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
LnEvaluation, β0     
Intercept, γ00 9.475 0.285 <0.001  
Age, γ01 -0.019 0.014 0.180 Removed 
Gender, γ02 0.805 0.423 0.061 Kept  
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1     
Intercept, γ10 0.813 0.092 <0.001  
Age, γ11 -0.005 0.004 0.255 Removed  
Gender, γ12 0.125 0.136 0.359 Removed 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2     
Intercept, γ20 1.363 0.162 <0.001  
Age, γ21 -0.011 0.008 0.168 Removed 
Gender, γ22 0.182 0.241 0.451 Removed 
 
Fourth, I added level-1 moderators (Frame, Frame*LnSubOut, and 
Frame*LnSubPr) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant 
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in 
Table 13, only Frame was statistically significant. 
 
Table 13 
Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 2 
Moderator Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
Frame -0.354 0.137 .011 Kept 
Frame*LnSubOut -0.080 0.087 .362 Removed 
Frame*LnSubPr 0.032 0.127 .805 Removed 
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Fifth, I tested my final model by adding the level-2 moderators (Nascent and 
System). I added Nascent and System as predictors of the intercept and slopes 
(LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). I calculated effect sizes of the final model by 
using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988), 𝑑 =
𝛾
√𝜏00+𝜎2
. The final model is as follows:  
 
Level-1 Model 
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) + 
β3j*(Frameij) + rij  
Level-2 Model 
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Genderj) + γ02*(Nascentj) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Nascentj) + γ12*(Systemj) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Nascentj) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j  
β3j = γ30 + u3j  
 
The HLM results for this final model (see Table 11) indicate that Nascent has a 
statistically significant relationship with the intercept of dependent variable, LnEvaluation. 
That is, the average LnEvaluation of nascent entrepreneurs is 0.74 smaller than that of non-
entrepreneurs when everything else is equal. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this moderating 
effect is small. The System has a moderate effect on the slope of LnSubOutcome. That is, 
the slope of LnSubOutcome is 0.34 bigger when participants use more System 2 thinking 
than when participants use more System 1 thinking. The Cohen’s d (1988) of this 
moderating effect is very small. There is no moderation effect on the slope of 
LnSubProbability. The Frame has a moderate effect on the dependent variable. That is, the 
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average LnEvaluation of gain frame is 0.35 smaller than that of loss frame. The Cohen’s d 
(1988) of this moderating effect is very small. 
The results of Model 2 show that nascent entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than 
non-entrepreneurs. Because of most evaluations are lower than the expected values, the 
evaluations of nascent entrepreneurs are lower than non-entrepreneurs means that the 
evaluations of nascent entrepreneurs are farther divergent from the expected values.  
The results show that the different types of thinking influence the subjective values 
of outcomes. People’s subjective values of outcomes are higher when they use more 
System 2 thinking than when they use more System 1 thinking. That is, people will have 
evaluations that are closer to the expected values when they use more System 2 thinking. 
This result is consistent with dual-process theory. 
The results show that people’s evaluations of gain frame are lower than those of 
loss frame. That is, people overweight the losses. This result is consistent with prospect 
theory. 
Consequently, the results of HLM model 2 are similar with the results of HLM 
model 1, which support that the difference of decision making between entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs also exists between nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
 
HLM Model 3: Entrepreneurs 
In model 3, I only included entrepreneur samples. There were 62 entrepreneurs who 
completed 933 evaluations. In this model, I tested whether the cognitive differences I found 
in HLM model 1 due to the acquired attribute of entrepreneurial practice. Therefore, I used 
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Experience as a moderator and grand-mean centered it. I used the same HLM variables 
shown in Table 5. Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations.  
First, I ran a null model that only includes dependent variable and does not include 
any independent variables. The ICC is 73.8%. That is, 73.8% of variance of subjective 
values can be explained by the difference among individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Model 3 
  Mean SD Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 LnEvaluation 9.305 2.994 1                
2 LnSubOutcome 10.943 0.578 .130 *** 1               
3 LnSubProbabilty -1.046 0.542 .202 *** -.115 *** 1              
4 Frame 0.490 0.500 -.069 * -.002  .014  1            
5 Experience  6.185 4.736 -.142 *** -.004  .017  .001  1          
6 System 0.448 0.498 .009  .000  .015  -.016  -.100 ** 1        
7 Age 37.971 15.147 -.246 *** -.003  .014  .001  .552 *** -.088 ** 1      
8 Gender 0.434 0.496 -.049  .006  .000  .011  .149 * -.002  -.012  1    
9 Frame*LnSubOut 0.001 0.402 .093 ** .695 *** -.084 ** .002  -.001  .003  .001  .007  1  
10 Frame*LnSubPr 0.006 0.380 .142 *** -.084 * .701 *** .015  .011  .015  .007  -.004  -.120 *** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
N = 1,005. 





HLM Results of Model 3 
 Null model Level-1 IV model Control model Final model 
Fixed effects Coefficient (SE) 
LnEvaluation, β0         
Intercept, γ00 9.30(0.33) *** 9.26(0.33) *** 9.26(0.32) *** 9.57(0.45) *** 
Age, γ01     -0.04(0.02) * -0.04(0.03) 
Experience, γ02       -0.01(0.08) 
System, γ03       -0.23(0.65)  
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1         
Intercept, γ10   0.84(0.09) *** 0.83(0.08) *** 0.77(0.12) *** 
Age, γ11     -0.01(0.00)  -0.00(0.02)  
Experience, γ12       -0.02(0.02)  
System, γ13       0.13(0.17) 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2         
Intercept, γ20   1.37(0.12) *** 1.37(0.12) *** 1.34(0.17) *** 
Experience, γ21       -0.00(0.03)  
System, γ22       0.21(0.25)  
For Frame slope, β3         
Intercept, γ30       -0.51(0.19) ** 
Random effects Variance component (SD) 
LnEvaluation, u0 6.60(2.57) *** 6.76(2.60) *** 6.28(2.51) *** 7.04(2.65) *** 
LnSubOutcome slope, u1   0.18(0.42) *** 0.14(0.38) ** 0.32(0.57) *** 
LnSubProbability slope, u2   0.60(0.77) *** 0.60(0.77) *** 0.80(0.90) *** 
Frame slope, u3       2.16(1.46) *** 
Level-1, r 2.34(1.63)  1.39(1.18)  1.39(1.18)  0.64(0.80)  
Deviance 3672.12  3306.00  3299.82  2881.29  
Estimated parameters 3  10  12  23  




Second, I added independent variables (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability) into 
the model as level-1 variables. I let all level-2 variances be random. The results (see Table 
15) indicated that they are all statistically significant. Therefore, I kept them random in the 
model.  
Third, I built a conditional model by adding control variables (Age and Gender) to 
level-2 intercept and slopes. Then, I eliminated all statistically non-significant level-2 
effects (p > .100) to get the final control model (see Table 16). The results indicate that 
Age is significantly influences the intercept of LnEvaluation and slope of LnSubOutcome 
(see Table 16).  
 
Table 16 
Trim Decisions of Control Variables of Model 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
LnEvaluation, β0     
Intercept, γ00 9.144 0.427 <0.001  
Age, γ01 -0.045 0.021 0.038 Kept 
Gender, γ02 0.265 0.646 0.683 Removed 
For LnSubOutcome slope, β1     
Intercept, γ10 0.935 0.110 <0.001  
Age, γ11 -0.010 0.005 0.069 Kept 
Gender, γ12 -0.229 0.167 0.175 Removed 
For LnSubProbability slope, β2     
Intercept, γ20 1.286 0.163 <0.001  
Age, γ21 0.002 0.008 0.784 Removed 
Gender, γ22 0.184 0.248 0.462 Removed 
 
 
 Fourth, I added level-1 moderators (Frame, Frame*LnSubOutcome, and 
Frame*LnSubProbability) into the model as grand centered. I kept statistically significant 
moderator in the model and removed statistically non-significant moderators. As shown in 




Trim Decisions of Level-1 Moderators of Model 3 
Moderator Coefficient Standard error p-value Trim decision 
Frame -0.501 0.198 .014 Kept 
Frame*LnSubOut 0.048 0.111 .659 Removed 




I added Experience (grand centered) and System (uncentered) to the level 2 
intercept and slopes (LnSubOutcome and LnSubProbability). However, none of them was 
significant (see Table 15). The final model shows as following:  
 
Level-1 Model 
LnEvaluationij = β0j + β1j*(LnSubOutcomeij) + β2j*(LnSubProbabilityij) + 
β3j*(Frameij) + rij  
Level-2 Model 
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Agej) + γ02*(Experiencej) + γ03*(Systemj) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11*(Agej) + γ12*(Experiencej) + γ13*(Systemj) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21*(Experiencej) + γ22*(Systemj) + u2j  
β3j = γ30 + u3j  
 
The results indicate that the moderation effects I find in HLM model 1 and HLM 
model 2 are not statistically significant in HLM model 3 (see Table 7, Table 11, and Table 
15). That means there is no statistically significant difference among entrepreneurs. 
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Entrepreneurial experience has no statistically significant effect on entrepreneurs’ 
evaluations of opportunities. Consequently, H4 is supported, however, H5 is not supported. 
That is, the cognitive differences in decision-making between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs are more likely due to the natural proclivities of entrepreneurs themselves, 




CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Conclusion  
The reasons that people become entrepreneurs are still not clear in entrepreneurship 
research (Lu & Tao, 2010; Sørensen & Fassiotto, 2011). It is an important question in 
entrepreneurship. If we knew the reasons that people become entrepreneurs, we could 
identify them ex ante from the general population, and we can better understand the logic 
of entrepreneurial decision-making. 
This dissertation addresses this question by decomposing it into two related 
questions. First, do entrepreneurs make different decision compared to non-entrepreneurs 
when they are facing the same opportunities under risk? Second, are these differences in 
decision-making due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs or due to the attributes 
acquired from entrepreneurial practice? 
Scholars have examined entrepreneurial decision-making from different 
perspectives. Scholars also argue that the entrepreneurial-decision-making research should 
focus on the nexus between entrepreneurs and opportunities (Alvarez et al., 2013; Grégoire 
& Shepherd, 2012; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & Venkataraman, 2010; Shane, 2012). 
However, early research of entrepreneurial decision-making only identified very few 
limited systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz & 
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Barney, 1997). Recently scholars have achieved some progress in cognitive thinking 
(Blume & Covin, 2011; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Kickul et al., 2009). However, there is 
an issue in existing research. Scholars only study the nexus from one side, either from 
entrepreneur side or from opportunity side. Therefore, it is important to study the nexus 
between entrepreneurs and opportunities from both aspects simultaneously.  
This dissertation addresses the differences in entrepreneurial decision-making 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs by focusing on the nexus between 
entrepreneurs and opportunities. Based on dual-process theory, I examined how different 
styles of thinking of entrepreneurs influence their decision-making. Based on prospect 
theory, I examined how different types of framing of opportunities influence 
entrepreneurial decision-making. 
This dissertation also addresses whether the differences in decision-making 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are due to the natural proclivity of some 
entrepreneurs or due to entrepreneurial practice. If the differences are due to the natural 
proclivity of some entrepreneurs, we should observe these differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, however, not between nascent entrepreneurs and 
experienced entrepreneurs. On the other side, if the differences learned or acquired during 
or from entrepreneurial practice, we should observe these differences between nascent 
entrepreneurs and experienced entrepreneurs and between non-entrepreneurs and 
experienced entrepreneurs. We should observe no differences between non-entrepreneurs 
and nascent entrepreneurs. 
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
tend to over-weight the opportunities that have small probabilities and to under-weight the 
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opportunities that have medium and large probabilities. This finding is consistent with 
prospect theory. 
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that different types of framing of opportunities 
influence entrepreneurial decision-making. Specifically, the evaluations of opportunities 
in loss frame are higher than the evaluations of opportunities in gain frame. However, my 
results provide insufficient evidence that different types of framing of opportunities 
influence the value function or the weighting function. 
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that different styles of thinking of 
entrepreneurs influence the value function. Specifically, the subjective values of outcomes 
are higher when people use more System 2 thinking than System 1 thinking. However, my 
results provide insufficient evidence that different styles of thinking influence the 
weighting function.  
The results of HLM model 1 indicate that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
make different decisions. Specifically, the evaluations of opportunities are lower for 
entrepreneurs than for non-entrepreneurs. However, my results provide insufficient 
evidence that entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are different in their value function or 
weighting function. 
The results of HLM model 2 indicate that the same differences also exist between 
nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. However, my results provide no evidence 
that these differences exist among entrepreneurs when I used entrepreneurial experience as 
the moderator in HLM model 3. Therefore, based on my findings, these differences are 
more likely to predate people becoming entrepreneurs. In other words, these differences 
are more likely due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs rather than being 
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acquired or learned from entrepreneurial practice.  At minimum, we can say that however 
these differences were acquired before becoming an entrepreneur. 
In summary, the style of thinking and the type of framing both influence 
entrepreneurial decision-making. If people use more System 1 thinking, they tend to 
generate higher subjective evaluations of opportunities. If people face opportunities in loss 
frame, they tend to generate higher subjective evaluations of opportunities. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs tend to generate lower subjective evaluations than non-entrepreneurs do, 
which is more likely due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs. 
Contributions 
This study contributes to the literature theoretically and practically in several ways. 
First, this research is the first study to investigate the nexus between entrepreneurs and 
opportunities as it relates to entrepreneurial decision making. Including both aspects is 
important because entrepreneurial decision-making occurs at and often incorporates or is 
affected by both entrepreneurs and opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2014; Shane, 2012; 
Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012). The results of this study indicate that 
both entrepreneurs’ thinking style and opportunity framing can influence entrepreneurial 
decision-making. Second, this study provides evidence in support of the application of 
prospect theory to research on entrepreneurial decision-making. Prospect theory argues 
that the framing influences decision-making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). In particular, entrepreneurs evaluate opportunities differently when the 
opportunities are described in different framings. Next, this study also provides evidence 
in support of the application of dual-process theory to research on entrepreneurship 
decision-making. Dual-process theory indicates that the style of thinking influences 
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decision making (Evans, 2008; Salas et al., 2010). In particular, entrepreneurs’ evaluations 
of opportunities are higher when they use more System 2 thinking. Furthermore, this study 
provides a possible way to investigate the reasons that people become entrepreneurs. 
Scholars have identified some cognitive differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs (Baron, 1998; Haynie, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2012). However, it is difficult 
to prove whether these differences were due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs 
or were acquired from entrepreneurial practice. This study improves our understanding of 
this question by testing the cognitive differences in two perspectives. One is between non-
entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs and the other is between nascent entrepreneurs 
and experienced entrepreneurs. If the differences are due to the natural proclivity of 
entrepreneurs, we should observe significant differences between non-entrepreneurs and 
nascent entrepreneurs. On the other hand, if the differences were acquiring from 
entrepreneurial practice, we should observe the moderation effect of entrepreneurial 
experience. The results show that there are significant differences between non-
entrepreneurs and nascent entrepreneurs and that there is no moderation effect from 
entrepreneurial experience. Therefore, these cognitive differences between entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs are more likely due to the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs. 
Discussion  
Regarding the unresolved questions that I mentioned at the beginning of this 
dissertation, the findings of this dissertation advance our understanding of these questions. 
The first unresolved question was about the quality of entrepreneurial decision-making: do 
entrepreneurs make better decisions than non-entrepreneurs? According to the findings of 
this dissertation, the answer is not always. Entrepreneurs have lower evaluations of 
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opportunities than non-entrepreneurs (see Figure 8). The evaluations of both entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs are higher than the expected values of the opportunities when the 
probabilities of the opportunities are small. In this circumstance, evaluations of 
entrepreneurs are closer to the expected value of the opportunities than those of non-
entrepreneurs are. That is, entrepreneurs make better decisions. However, the evaluations 
of both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are lower than the expected values of the 
opportunities when the probabilities of the opportunities are medium and large. In this 
circumstance, evaluations of non-entrepreneurs are closer to the expected value of the 
opportunities than those of entrepreneurs are. That is, non-entrepreneurs make better 
decisions. 
The second unresolved question was about the difference between decision-making 
by entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs: do entrepreneurs make different decisions than 
non-entrepreneurs? By comparing the samples from entrepreneurs and general population, 
I find entrepreneurs make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have 
lower evaluations of opportunities than non-entrepreneurs. This finding reveals that 
entrepreneurs have lower evaluations than non-entrepreneurs when they are facing the 
same opportunities. If so, then why did non-entrepreneurs not become entrepreneurs since 
they had higher evaluations of opportunities? One possible reason is that the financial 
return was not the only factor that influenced an entrepreneur’s decision to discover 
opportunities. For example, scholars have found non-financial benefits and switching costs 
may influence entrepreneurial opportunity discovery (Holland & Shepherd, 2013). 
Because this study only investigated the influence of the outcome and probability, and not 
possible motivating factors, it is a limitation of this research. However, other factors may 
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also influence entrepreneurial opportunity discovery. Future research can further 
investigate the influence of these other factors. 
The third unresolved question was about whether these differences in decision-
making were due to the natural proclivity of some entrepreneurs or were acquired from 
entrepreneurial practice. The findings of this dissertation suggest one of the reasons that 
entrepreneurs make different decisions than non-entrepreneurs is more likely due to 
differences in the natural proclivity of entrepreneurs than due to the acquired attributes 
from entrepreneurial practice. In other words, it appears that on average entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs are different before they become entrepreneurs. Future research can 
investigate how they are different. There are some possible aspects, such as entrepreneurial 
passion (Cardon, Foo, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2012; Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 
2009), entrepreneurial persistence (Gimeno et al., 1997; Holland & Shepherd, 2013), and 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (McGee, Peterson, Mueller, & Sequeira, 2009; Tumasjan & 
Braun, 2011). Being different also could motivate a very interesting conversation. There 
are several perspectives that we could use to investigate this idea. For example, since 
people become entrepreneurs are due to their natural proclivities, how can we identify these 
natural proclivities ex ante? Can we nurture these natures by education? All these could be 
very interesting future research. 
There are other limitations in this dissertation. First, this study only investigates the 
opportunities under risk. Entrepreneurs evaluated the opportunities under the situation that 
they know all the outcomes and the probabilities of opportunities.  However, not all 
opportunities are risks for entrepreneurs. Because the complexity and uncertainty of the 
environments in which entrepreneurs find themselves, some opportunities are uncertainties 
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for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs either do not know the outcome, or do not know the 
probability. In other situations, entrepreneurs do not know either the outcomes or the 
probabilities. Future studies can further investigate how entrepreneurs evaluate 
opportunities under uncertainty. Second, it is unclear whether the behavior of 
entrepreneurial decision-making is stable. Therefore, future longitudinal studies are 
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Definitions of Key Concepts  
Concept Definition 
Decision weight Depicts the influence of a probability on the value of a 
gamble (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Diminishing sensitivity The difference between the subjective values of two 
outcomes is larger, the closer those outcomes are to the 
reference point (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Expected utility The probability-weighted average of the utilities of a 
gamble’s outcomes, where utility refers to the pleasure 
the final wealth positions (i.e., current wealth plus the 
outcome of the gamble) will provide (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). 
Expected value The probability-weighted average of a gamble’s 
outcomes (Edwards, 1954). 
Experienced entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs who have started a business more than one 
year and/or started more than one business. 
Framing An individual’s interpretation of a decision (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). 
Framing of an opportunity An individual’s interpretation of an opportunity 
Gain frame Anticipating an outcome in excess of one’s reference 
point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Loss aversion A tendency to prefer minimizing losses to maximizing 
equivalent magnitude gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky1979). 
Loss frame Anticipating an outcome below one’s reference point 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Mixed gambles Gambles that offer both positive and negative outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Nascent entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs who are in the process of starting their first 
businesses.   
Prospect  A contract that yields outcome 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖 , 
where 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛 = 1  (Kahneman & 
Tversky1979). 
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Pure gambles Gambles that offer strictly positive or strictly negative 
outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Reference point The neutral position used to determine the extent to 
which outcomes constitute gains (which are above this 
position) or losses (which are below this position) 
(Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Risk Situations in which both outcomes and their probabilities 
of occurrence are known to the decision maker (Knight, 
1921). 
Risk aversion Preferring sure outcomes to probabilistic outcomes with 
greater expected value (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Risk seeking Preferring probabilistic outcomes to sure outcomes with 
greater expected value (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 
Styles of thinking Use more System 1 or System 2 thinking. 
Subjective value Depicts the value an individual perceives an outcome to 
be worth, reflecting the pleasure the outcome will 
provide (Kahneman & Tversky1979). 







Ten Field Phenomena Inconsistent with EU and Consistent with Cumulative Prospect Theory (Camerer, 2004, p. 149) 
Domain Phenomenon Description Type of Data Isolated 
Decision 
Ingredients References 
Stock market Equity premium Stock returns are 
too high relative 
to bond returns 
NYSE stock, 




Loss-aversion (Benartzi & 
Thaler, 1995) 
Stock market Disposition 
effect 
Hold losing 
stocks too long, 




Single stock (not 
portfolio) 









Single day (not 





Consumer goods Asymmetric 
price elasticities 
Purchases more 
sensitive to price 





























Status quo bias, 
Default bias 
Consumers do 


































longshots at the 
end of the day 
Track odds Single day Reflection effect (McGlothlin, 
1956) 














Lottery betting Demand for 
Lotto 
More tickets 












APPENDIX C  
 
A SAMPLE OF SURVEY
Dear Participate:   You are being invited to participate in a research study by 
answering the attached survey about entrepreneurial decision-making.  There are no known 
risks for your participation in this research study.  The information collected may not 
benefit you directly.  The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The 
information you provide will help us to understand how entrepreneurs make 
decisions.  Your completed survey will be stored at University of Louisville.  The survey 
will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.    
Individuals from the Department of Entrepreneurship, the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), and other 
regulatory agencies may inspect these records.  In all other respects, however, the data will 
be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law.  Should the data be published, your 
identity will not be disclosed.    
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  By completing this survey you agree to take 
part in this research study.  You do not have to answer any questions that make you 
uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you 
may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking 
part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.     
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If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please 
contact: Dalong Ma, 502 939 9681, dalong.ma@louisville.edu.     
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the 
Human Subjects Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can discuss any 
questions about your rights as a research subject, in private, with a member of the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). You may also call this number if you have other 
questions about the research, and you cannot reach the research staff, or want to talk to 
someone else. The IRB is an independent committee made up of people from the University 
community, staff of the institutions, as well as people from the community not connected 
with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study.    
If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you do 
not wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24 hour hot line 
answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.    
 
Sincerely,    




Are you currently running a business? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
 
Please base your answers to the following questions on the feelings you experience. 
 
When you hear the name "George Clooney", what do you feel?   Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling: 
 
When you hear the name "George W. Bush", what do you feel?   Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling: 
 
When you hear the name "Princess Diana", what do you feel?   Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling: 
 
When you hear the name "9/11", what do you feel?   Please use one word to describe your 
predominant feeling: 
 





Please work carefully and deliberately to calculate the answers to the questions posed 
below. 
 
If an object travels at five feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet will it 
travel in 360 seconds? 
 
Suppose a student bought a pen and a pencil for a total of $11, and that the pen cost $10 
more than the pencil. Then, by your calculations how much did the pencil cost? 
 
If a consumer bought 30 books for $540, then, by your calculations, on average, how much 
did the consumer pay for each book? 
 
If a baker bought nine pounds of flour at $1.50 per pound, then, by your calculations how 
much did the baker pay in total? 
 
If a company bought 15 computers for $1200 each, then, by your calculations, how much 





There is a venture idea which has a 75% chance to earn a  $200,000 payoff and a 25% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $100,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 5% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance 





There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 95% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance 
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance 
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this idea. 
 
There is a venture idea which has a 25% chance to earn a $500,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the maximum amount you will pay to buy this 





There is a venture idea which has a 50% chance to earn a $200,000 payoff and a 50% 
chance to lose money, but the amount of loss is unknown. Please tell us the maximum 





You have a venture idea which has a 75% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 25% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this 
idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $100,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this 
idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this 
idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 5% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 95% chance 





You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $1,000,000 payoff and a 75% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this 
idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 95% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 5% chance 
to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 50% 
chance to get a $0 payoff. Please tell us the minimum amount you will accept to sell this 
idea. 
 
You have a venture idea which has a 25% chance to get a $500,000 payoff and a 75% 






You have a venture idea which has a 50% chance to get a $200,000 payoff and a 50% 
chance to lose money, but the amount of loss is unknown. Please tell us the minimum 




Please indicate that how you evaluated the above venture ideas: 
 
Mcheck1 I made my decisions fast, intuitively and unconsciously. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Slightly Disagree (3) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
 Slightly Agree (5) 
 Agree (6) 
 Strongly Agree (7) 
 
I made my decisions slowly, analytically and consciously. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Slightly Disagree (3) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) 
 Slightly Agree (5) 
 Agree (6) 




Please tell us more about yourself: 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
What is your race? 
 White/Caucasian (1) 
 African American (2) 
 Hispanic (3) 
 Asian (4) 
 Native American (5) 
 Pacific Islander (6) 
 Other (7) 
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What was your age as of January 1, 2014? 
 Under 18 (1) 
 18 (2) 
 19 (3) 
 20 (4) 
 21 (5) 
 22 (6) 
 23 (7) 
 24 (8) 
 25 (9) 
 26 (10) 
 27 (11) 
 28 (12) 
 29 (13) 
 30 (14) 
 31 (15) 
 32 (16) 
 33 (17) 
 34 (18) 
 35 (19) 
 36 (20) 
 37 (21) 
 38 (22) 
 39 (23) 
 40 (24) 
 41 (25) 
 42 (26) 
 43 (27) 
 44 (28) 
 45 (29) 
 46 (30) 
 47 (31) 
 48 (32) 
 49 (33) 
 50 (34) 
 51 (35) 
 52 (36) 
 53 (37) 
 54 (38) 
 55 (39) 
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 56 (40) 
 57 (41) 
 58 (42) 
 59 (43) 
 60 (44) 
 61 (45) 
 62 (46) 
 63 (47) 
 64 (48) 
 65 (49) 
 66 (50) 
 67 (51) 
 68 (52) 
 69 (53) 
 70 (54) 
 71 (55) 
 72 (56) 
 73 (57) 
 74 (58) 
 75 (59) 
 Over 75 (60) 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School (1) 
 High School / GED (2) 
 Some College (3) 
 2-year College Degree (4) 
 4-year College Degree (5) 
 Masters Degree (6) 
 Doctoral Degree (7) 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8) 
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What is your annual income range? 
 Below $20,000 (1) 
 $20,000 - $39,999 (2) 
 $40,000 - $59,999 (4) 
 $60,000 - $79,999 (6) 
 $80,000 - $99,999 (7) 
 $100,000 - $119,999 (9) 
 $120,000 - $139,999 (5) 
 $140,000 - $159,999 (3) 
 $160,000 - $179,999 (12) 
 $180,000 - $199,999 (13) 
 $200,000 or more (8) 
 
Do you have the intention to start a business? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
When do you expect to start this business? 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1-2 years (2) 
 3-5 years (3) 
 6-10 years (4) 
 more than 10 years (5) 
 
Is your current business family owned? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Is your current family business a family succession? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Does your family business have a family succession envisioned in the future? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
What is your business's primary activity?  
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (23) 
 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction (24) 
 Utilities (25) 
 Construction (26) 
 Manufacturing (27) 
 Wholesale Trade (28) 
 Retail Trade (29) 
 Transportation and Warehousing (30) 
 Information (31) 
 Finance and Insurance (32) 
 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (33) 
 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (34) 
 Management of Companies and Enterprises (35) 
 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services (36) 
 Educational Services (37) 
 Health Care and Social Assistance (38) 
 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (39) 
 Accommodation and Food Services (40) 
 Public Administration (42) 
 Other Services (41) 
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How long have you owned your current business? 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1 year (2) 
 2 years (3) 
 3 years (4) 
 4 years (5) 
 5 years (6) 
 6 years (7) 
 7 years (8) 
 8 years (9) 
 9 years (10) 
 10 years (11) 
 more than 10 years (12) 
 more than 20 years (13) 
 
How many employees currently work in your business? (Not including yourself) 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 6 (7) 
 7 (8) 
 8 (9) 
 9 (10) 
 10-19 (11) 
 20-49 (12) 
 50-99 (13) 
 100-249 (14) 
 250-499 (15) 
 500-999 (16) 
 1000 or more (17) 
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How many companies have you founded in your lifetime? 
 0 (1) 
 1 (2) 
 2 (3) 
 3 (4) 
 4 (5) 
 5 (6) 
 6 (7) 
 7 (8) 
 8 (9) 
 9 (10) 
 10 (11) 
 over 10 (12) 
 
How long is it since you founded your first company? 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1 year (2) 
 2 years (3) 
 3 years (4) 
 4 years (5) 
 5 years (6) 
 6 years (7) 
 7 years (8) 
 8 years (9) 
 9 years (10) 
 10 years (11) 
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